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INTRODUCTION
Attitudes and policies towards liberalisation of international capital flows in
general and foreign direct investment (FDI) in particular have been subject to con-
siderable controversy and flux (OECD 2002a). Recognition of the economic bene-
fits afforded by freedom of capital movements sometimes clash with concerns
about loss of national sovereignty and other possible adverse consequences. FDI,
even more than other types of capital flows, has historically given rise to these
conflicting views, because FDI involves a controlling stake by often large multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) over which domestic governments, it is feared, have
little power. The controversies have mostly focused on inward FDI, due to sensi-
tivity about foreign control over domestic industry. In the last few years, outward
FDI from OECD countries to developing countries has also been the focus of criti-
cism by NGOs and others who view such FDI as a cause of depressed labour and
environmental standards. For an effective rebuttal of such criticisms of outward
FDI, see Graham (2000).
Countries facing increased inflows of FDI have often experienced unease.
Many developing countries have until recently been wary of inward FDI. Even in
the United States, the surge of Japanese FDI in the 1980s led to widespread con-
cerns about excessive foreign control and adverse effects on national security, as
expressed in the popular press, and in legislative action.1 Critics of inward FDI
argue that there are adverse economic and political effects on the host country.
The alleged economic effects include balance of payments deficits, reduced
domestic research and development, diminished competition, crowding-out of
domestic firms and lower employment. Economic analysis has shown that most of
the alleged economic drawbacks of FDI are of little merit (Graham and
Krugman 1995). FDI has little long-run effects on employment and the trade bal-
ance, as these are determined by macroeconomic factors. While negative micro-
economic effects on domestic competition and local research and development
are conceivable, FDI inflows are more likely to enhance competition and local
technical capabilities. Indeed, most studies suggest that the benefits of inward
FDI are substantial (OECD 2002c). FDI is a form of international economic integra-
tion that brings gains to both parties according to the principle of comparative
advantage. In contrast to international trade which involves arms’ length transac-
tions, FDI involves intra-firm trade and transactions in intangible assets such as
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knowledge and reputation. Beyond the standard gains from trade, FDI inflows can
provide dynamic gains from technology transfer and skill-building. These benefits
are especially important in developing countries where foreign technology and
managerial expertise are lacking. As a source of outside capital, FDI has been seen
increasingly as advantageous relative to portfolio flows, due to the instability of
the latter.
The political concerns relating to threats to national security and excessive
political influence exerted by foreign firms are of possibly greater validity,
although Graham and Krugman (1995) argue that these too are sometimes exag-
gerated. In times of war, foreign ownership of strategic industries by enemy coun-
tries poses a clear danger to national security, but the practical import of this
consideration is negligible today, given that FDI flows occur overwhelmingly
among friendly countries. A more serious danger is the potentially adverse effects
of foreign control of industries important for defence capability. This issue is fur-
ther complicated by the difficulties of identifying such industries, given dual-use
civilian and military technologies, e.g. for electronics and aviation. To the extent
that FDI increases efficiency of such industries, however, it could also enhance
domestic defence capability, and in any case the number of industries involved is
limited. High levels of FDI could also be associated with increased political pres-
sure from foreign interest groups. While there may be some negative conse-
quences associated with lobbying by foreign firms, these are usually no worse
than those associated with pressures from domestic special interest groups. A
much more diffuse argument is that foreign control of high profile industries such
as airlines and telecommunications disturbs nationalistic sensitivities. Satisfying
such non-economic predilections must be balanced against the economic cost of
restrictions on FDI.
Overall, economic analysis suggests that with rare exceptions the appropriate
policy towards FDI is neutrality between foreign and domestic firms, neither
favouring nor discriminating against foreign investors. Neutrality involves both
right of establishment for foreign firms and national treatment of such firms once
they are established. Right of establishment signifies that there are no discrimina-
tory obstacles to foreign green-field investment or mergers and acquisitions.
National treatment involves non-discrimination in conducting business. Thus,
from an economic point of view, both discriminatory restrictions and special incen-
tives are of questionable merit, at least in developed countries with well-function-
ing markets.
Notwithstanding any remaining concerns about the adverse effects of FDI,
there can be little doubt that the general trend has been towards liberalisation,
especially in the past two decades. Throughout the world, policymakers have
increasingly been persuaded of the merits of inward FDI in terms of employment,
capital and especially transfer of technology. Consequently, many countries have
OECD Economic Studies No. 36, 2003/1
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reduced restrictions on FDI and adopted incentives to encourage FDI
(UNCTAD 1996). Still, some restrictions remain in place even in countries that gen-
erally welcome FDI.
This paper focuses on the nature and extent of these restrictions in OECD
countries and their evolution over time. It attempts to classify and quantify dis-
crimination against foreign firms regarding right of establishment and national
treatment. There are several important reasons for such a study. First, there is lit-
tle comprehensive information on national policies towards FDI. In contrast to
tariff, and even non-tariff barriers to trade, there have been very few studies
quantifying restrictions on FDI. The existing literature is discussed below.
Second, and related, information on the extant barriers to FDI could be help-
ful for international negotiations of investment rules. There have been a number
of recent initiatives aimed at formulating international investment agreements
(Box 1), although these suffered a blow with the failure of the Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment (MAI) at the OECD in 1998. According to Graham (2000,
p. 187), greater knowledge of the costs and benefits of liberalisation of investment
would be conducive to the success of such negotiations. Of course, the nature and
magnitude of the restrictions in force is a starting point for any such calculations of
costs and benefits.
Third, restrictions on FDI are identified as a key variable in the recent theo-
retical knowledge-capital model of the multinational corporation (Markusen and
Maskus, 2001). In this literature, as in previous models of the MNC, firms choose
where to produce according to the costs and benefits of alternative locations. Bar-
riers to FDI raise the costs of foreign investment. In econometric tests of the
knowledge-capital model, researchers have used measures based on surveys of
investor opinion reported in the World Competitiveness Report, rather than objective
measures. Although these subjective measures are usually statistically-significant
in FDI regressions, it is also useful to develop objective indicators that are compa-
rable across countries and over time. This paper is part of a larger OECD project
on the determinants of FDI (Nicoletti et al. 2003). The effects of the computed
restrictions on FDI patterns are studied in Nicoletti et al. but are not discussed in
this paper.
FDI restrictions are but one of a set of policies that discriminate between for-
eign and domestic inventors. Corporate taxes have been the focus of considerable
research and a comprehensive study for OECD countries is presented in Yoo
(2003). It would also be highly desirable to assemble information about specific
FDI incentives, but such information is even more difficult to obtain than for FDI
restrictions and falls beyond the scope of the present study.
A serious drawback is that the present study is primarily limited to overt
restrictions on FDI, mostly ignoring non-policy institutional restrictions, such as
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the nature of corporate governance, as well as policies that indirectly impinge on
FDI, notably economic and social regulation. In some instances, however, allega-
tions of government obstruction to foreign investment were considered. Despite
these limitations, the present study is the most comprehensive to date in terms of
country, time and sectoral coverage of FDI restrictions.
Box 1. International investment agreements
Formal international agreements on foreign direct investment are far less
extensive than on international trade, despite the importance of FDI in the world
economy. However, the 1990s have seen a substantial rise in the number of bilat-
eral investment protection treaties, and regional and bilateral trade agreements
in which investment disciplines figure prominently. These agreements include
NAFTA, the recent agreements concluded by Singapore with EFTA, Japan and
Australia and the Association Agreement between the European Community and
Chile. The European Union had already completely liberalised intra-EU capital
movements in the late 1980s.
The OECD has been an important actor in international discussions and
agreements on FDI.* At present the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Move-
ments forms the only multilateral framework in force on international capital flows,
including FDI. Under the Code, countries bind themselves to agreed measures
liberalising capital movements. Moreover, under the OECD Declaration on Inter-
national Investment and Multinational Enterprises, the 30 OECD countries and
7 non-OECD adhering countries are committed to accord national treatment to
foreign enterprises operating in their territories and to encourage their multina-
tional enterprises to engage in responsible business conduct in a variety of areas.
There are several investment-related provisions in the agreements related to
the World Trade Organisation. The Uruguay Round led to an agreement on Trade
Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) that restricts inter alia domestic-content
requirements. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) covers all
modes of service delivery, including “commercial presence” which is closely
related to FDI. The GATS commitments, however, apply only to industries where
countries have explicitly agreed to open their markets to foreign providers.
In 1996, the WTO also created the Working Group on the Relationship Between
Trade and Investment, a forum for discussion among WTO countries. At the Doha
Ministerial Conference in November 2001, the WTO members agreed on the prin-
ciple of undertaking negotiations on a multilateral framework after the 2003 WTO
ministerial meeting at Cancun (see OECD 2002b).
* Further discussion of OECD experience with investment rules and multilateral initiatives
concerning FDI can be found at www.oecd.org/daf/investment and in Graham (2000), Robertson
(2002) and Sauvé and Wilkie (2000). 
OECD Economic Studies No. 36, 2003/1
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METHOD OF QUANTIFYING RESTRICTIVENESS
In this section the method of quantifying restrictions is discussed. There are
several issues involved in computing the restriction scores. A classification of vari-
ous types of restrictions and a system of weighting are needed. These tasks are
greatly complicated by the disparate nature of restrictions across countries and
the inconsistent reporting of these restrictions. Sometimes it is difficult to deter-
mine the exact nature and incidence of a particular restriction without detailed
knowledge of a country’s productive structure and regulatory environment. Given
the difficulties in classifying and ranking the various restrictions, some studies
such as Sauvé and Steinfatt (in progress) and Hoekman (1995) are limited to
counting the number of restrictions. While this has the advantages of simplicity
and lack of arbitrariness, some restrictions are more important than others. For
example, a ban on foreign ownership is much more restrictive than a screening or
reporting requirement. It therefore seems preferable to attempt to weight differ-
ent restrictions according to their significance, even though such a procedure
surely entails some arbitrary judgements and errors.
This study adopts a variant of the methodology of the Australian Productivity
Commission (APC) which carried out a similar study for the APEC countries, Service
Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (Hardin and Holmes 1997, 2002, referred to hereaf-
ter as HH, available at www.pc.gov.au/ic/research/information/servtrad/index.html). In the
HH study, indices for FDI restrictions were calculated for 15 APEC countries for
11 service sectors, as classified by the GATS.
There have also been a number of other studies of restrictions on trade in ser-
vices, mostly also by the APC, for particular service sectors (for example Nguyen-
Hong 2000, Kalirajan 2000, a number of studies in Findlay and Warren 2000, and the
survey by McGuire 2002). Most APC and other studies present two sets of measures
of restrictions: 1) domestic, i.e. limitations on market access for all firms and 2) foreign,
i.e. discrimination against foreign firms in the form of limitations on national treat-
ment or most favoured nation (MFN). Here, however, the focus is limited to the lat-
ter. Non-discriminatory policies that affect market access and operations for both
domestic and foreign firms are not barriers to FDI per se. Also, these domestic barri-
ers are incorporated in the other policies considered in the quantitative analysis of
FDI for which these calculations were undertaken, and would duplicate these other
indicators. An exception, however, was made for state-owned monopolies, which by
their very nature preclude foreign ownership, and were considered to be tanta-
mount to a ban on foreign investment.
Restrictions on foreign ownership are the most obvious barriers to establish-
ment for FDI. They typically take the form of limiting the share of companies’
equity capital in a target sector that non-residents are allowed to hold, e.g. to less
than 50 per cent, or even prohibit any foreign ownership. Examples of majority
Measures of Restrictions on Inward Foreign Direct Investment for OECD Countries
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domestic ownership requirements include airlines in the European Union and
North American countries, telecommunications in Japan, and coastal and freshwater
shipping in the United States. Exclusive domestic ownership is also often applied
to natural resource sectors with the aim of giving citizens access to the associated
rents. For example, foreign ownership is banned in the fishing and energy sectors
in Iceland, and in the oil sector in Mexico.
Obligatory screening and approval procedures can also be used to limit FDI
though their constraining effects depend on the implementation of such practices.
Stipulations that foreign investors must show economic benefits can increase the
cost of entry and therefore may discourage the inflow of foreign capital. Such pro-
visions apply, for instance, for a few industries in Japan and for the acquisition of
more than 49 per cent of any existing enterprise in Mexico. Prior approval of FDI,
such as mandated for all FDI projects in a few OECD countries, could also limit for-
eign capital inflow if it is taken as a sign of an ambivalent attitude towards free
FDI, even though it may not be vigorously enforced. Simple pre- or post-notifica-
tion (as required in e.g. Japan) is, however, unlikely to have much direct impact on
capital inflows, but could have a negative signalling effect.
Other formal restrictions that can discourage FDI inflows include constraints
on the ability of foreign nationals either to manage or to work in affiliates of foreign
companies and other operational controls on these businesses. Stipulations that
nationals or residents must form a majority of the board of directors, as in insur-
ance companies in member countries of the European Union, in financial services
industries in Canada and in transport industries in Japan, may undermine foreign
owners’ control over their holdings and hence make them more hesitant to invest
under such circumstances. Similarly, if regulations restrict the employment of for-
eign nationals (as e.g. in Turkey), investors may judge that they cannot make use of
the necessary expertise to make their investment worthwhile. Also, operational
requirements, such as the restrictions vis-à-vis non-members on cabotage in most
European Union countries for maritime transport may limit profits of foreign-
owned corporations, and hence the amount of funds foreign investors are willing
to commit.
Apart from the formal barriers discussed above, FDI flows can be held back
by opaque informal public or private measures. Indeed, claims abound that such
practices are used systematically to limit foreign ownership of domestic busi-
nesses. Thus, the US Special Trade Representative (2003) has frequently stated
that the system of corporate control in Japan has hampered investment by US
companies and that regulatory practices in telecommunications in the European
Union work as de facto FDI restraining measures. Similarly, Japanese Ministry of
Economy, Trade, and Industry (2003) claims that FDI in financial services in the
United States is restricted by the diverse and complex set of regulations at the
state level and that barriers relating to interconnections hamper foreign entry into
OECD Economic Studies No. 36, 2003/1
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telecommunications in the European Union. Also, the European Union cites the
continuing role of administrative guidance to firms in Japan by government offi-
cials as a practice that hampers foreign ownership of Japanese enterprises.
Table 1 presents the scoring system used to calculate the overall restrictive-
ness indicators for each industry and country based on regulations in each of the
three areas: equity, screening, and other restrictions. The total score ranges
between 0 and 1. Equity limitations and screening are related to right of establish-
ment, whereas the others pertain to national treatment of established firms. The
methodology and weighting scheme are broadly similar to those used by HH, in
particular the high weight given to equity restrictions. The latter are weighted
Table 1.  Coefficients on FDI restrictions
Maximum 1.0
1. If foreign equity is banned, then the other criteria become irrelevant, so that the index is at 1.0. It is possible that
various scores sum to slightly more than 1.0 when foreign equity is not totally banned, and in such cases, the index
is capped at 1.0.
Source: OECD, adapted from Hardin and Holmes (1997).
Type of restriction Scores
Foreign equity limits
No foreign equity allowed 1
1 to 19 % foreign equity allowed 0.6
20-34% foreign equity allowed 0.4
35-49 % foreign equity allowed 0.3
50-74% foreign equity allowed 0.2
75-99% foreign equity allowed 0.1
No restriction but unbound 0.05
Screening and approval
Investor must show economic benefits 0.2
Approval unless contrary to national interest 0.1
Notification (pre or post) 0.05
Other restrictions
Board of directors/Managers
Majority must be nationals or residents 0.1
At least 1 must be national or resident 0.05
Must be locally licensed 0.025
Movement of people
No entry 0.1
Less than one year 0.075
One to two years 0.05
Three to four years 0.025
Input and operational restrictions
Domestic content must be more than 50% 0.1
Other 0.05
Total1 Between 0 and 1
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highly in view of the fact that foreign ownership is a necessary and essential condi-
tion for FDI. Screening and limitations on management are generally less impor-
tant. Also, non-linearities are built into the scoring system to reflect the idea that a
total ban on foreign ownership is significantly more restrictive than allowing a
small foreign equity stake. Similarly, requiring an investor to demonstrate eco-
nomic benefits is much more stringent than quasi-automatic approval, which in
turn is considerably more demanding than simple notification. Other restrictions
include constraints on the nationality or residency of executives and managers,
duration of permissible work permits for expatriate executives, input restrictions,
and miscellaneous other restrictions, such as discriminatory government regula-
tions or approval processes. See Annex I for further discussion and a comparison
with the HH weighting system.
Restrictiveness is calculated at the industry level and then a weighted-average
is obtained using FDI and trade weights. The inclusion of trade flows in the weight-
ing scheme is meant to partially alleviate the problem of endogeneity associated
with FDI weights: highly restricted sectors will tend to experience less FDI. OECD
and EU average restrictions are simple averages of country scores. Annex II further
discusses the sectoral weights and provides some sensitivity analysis.
DATA SOURCES2
GATS Commitments.3 HH and most other studies of restrictions on trade in ser-
vices use the GATS commitments as their primary database, supplemented by
other sources. The GATS schedules (WTO, 2002) are well organised, easy to under-
stand, and authoritative. There is a close connection between the GATS classifica-
tion of services and those used in this project (Table 2). As HH and others note, a
limitation of the GATS commitments is that they are mostly “positive” in nature,
i.e. they are commitments to open markets. This is in contrast to “negative” lists of
exceptions to liberalisation. A problem with the GATS positive lists is that the
absence of a positive commitment in some sector cannot necessarily be construed
as a restriction. A country may simply have failed to list this sector in its schedule.
Or, if the sector is restricted, GATS may be silent on the nature of the restriction. A
more obvious limitation of the GATS schedules is that they only cover the service
sectors. While services are undoubtedly the most highly restricted sectors, there
are some restrictions in other sectors too.
OECD Code of Liberalisation and related OECD documents.4 The OECD Code of Lib-
eralisation of capital movements contains a succinct list of “reservations” for FDI
(item I-A in the Code). This Code has the advantage of being “negative”, i.e. any
non-listed sectors can be assumed free of restrictions, and are thus not subject to
the ambiguity of interpretation as in the GATS. Also, the Code covers all sectors,
OECD Economic Studies No. 36, 2003/1
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not just services. A further major advantage of the Code is that it is possible to
construct a time series of restrictions as the Code goes back to the 1960s
(OECD 1992, 1987, 1982). In addition, the results were cross-checked against reser-
vations submitted by member countries in the course of the negotiations for the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).
Other sources. The United States Special Trade Representative (USTR), Japa-
nese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and the European Union
(EU) issue analyses of barriers to trade and FDI in their major partners and these
are available on the internet (see references). An additional source is a CD from
Price-Waterhouse-Coopers (2001) that Wei (2000) has used in his research on FDI.
The Australian Productivity Commission has made available on its website a com-
prehensive tabulation of all of its sector-specific findings for a large group of coun-
tries, which includes almost all OECD countries.5
RESULTS
It should be again acknowledged that despite efforts to rely on multiple
sources and objective reports, there is inevitably an arbitrary and subjective
aspect to some dimensions of the scoring. In particular, hidden institutional or
Table 2.  Correspondence between OECD FDI project, 
GATS and Australian Productivity Commission studies in the service sectors
1. Covers all countries in OECD FDI project except for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland and Poland. n.a.  indicates
no study is available.
2. Hardin and Holmes’s study covered all GATS sectors except for “Other”.
Source: OECD, GATS and Australian Productivity Commission studies in the service sectors.
OECD FDI project GATS and Hardin-Holmes Australian Productivity Commission studies1
Real estate and business Business services Accounting, architectural, legal, engineering
Post and telecommunication Communication services Telecommunications
Construction Construction n.a.
Wholesale and retail trade, 
repairs
Distribution (wholesale, 
retail)
Distribution
Financial intermediation Finance Banking
Transport and storage Transport Maritime transport
Hotels and restaurants Tourism n.a.
Memo: Other GATS and Hardin-Holmes sectors2
Education
Environmental 
Health and social services
Recreation, culture and sporting
Other (repairs)
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behavioural barriers to FDI are very difficult to ascertain and quantify and the
scoring reported here mostly ignores such barriers. A case in point is the allega-
tion that the Japanese market is difficult to enter due to covert collusion between
government and kereitsu business groups. Some attempt to include such hidden
barriers was made, if such arguments are noted and documented in the USTR,
METI or EU reports, but these received relatively little weight in relation to the
statutory barriers, given the difficulties of quantifying these allegations.6 Also, the
extent of enforcement of statutory restrictions is difficult to determine and was not
factored into the calculations. The stringency of screening requirements could be
particularly variable across countries.
It is possible that some countries are more forthcoming than others in self-
reporting their restrictions. It could then be that more transparent countries
receive higher scores, not because they are in fact more restrictive, but because
they are more complete in their reporting.
Finally, reported restrictions are not standardised and there are difficulties in
evaluating idiosyncratic restrictions in individual countries and putting them into
context. For example, the United States does not have a direct limitation on for-
eign investment in telecommunications but instead has equity restrictions on
companies holding broadcast and common carrier radio licenses. According to
several sources (the European Union, PriceWaterhouseCoopers), this is an impor-
tant de facto restriction on foreign investment in US telecoms, particularly for
mobile telephony. There are numerous such instances requiring judgements
about the relative severity of restrictions, given that this study covers 28 countries,
9 sectors, and 11 sub-sectors.
FDI restrictions can be either across-the-board, applying to all sectors, or sec-
tor-specific. The limitations on foreign equity levels are usually specified on an
industry-by-industry basis, whereas notification and authorisation requirements
are usually across-the-board.
The sectoral scores were aggregated with a combination of import and FDI
weights, as noted earlier (the “adjusted FDI” weights in Table A.2). See Annex II for
more detail and a comparison to value-added weights.
Cross-section results
Overall scores. A full set of FDI restrictions measures for 28 OECD countries were
determined for the period 1998-2000. Table 3 presents the detailed results and
Figure 1 provides an overview. Panel A of Figure 1 presents the baseline results,
while Panel B excludes the effect of screening as an alternate measure, in view of
the difficulties of assessing the impact of screening. There have been important
changes in some countries since 2000 that are not reflected in the results. In the
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Table 3.  Indices of FDI restrictions, 1998-2000
Source: See section on data sources.
Australia Austria Belgium Canada
Czech 
Republic
Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy
Business services
Legal 0.200 0.225 0.025 0.225 0.125 0.125 0.110 0.036 0.025 0.025 0.100 0.325 0.025 0.025
Accounting 0.200 0.575 0.025 0.225 0.450 0.125 0.110 0.036 0.025 0.069 0.100 0.325 0.025 0.025
Architecture 0.200 0.175 0.025 0.225 0.150 0.025 0.110 0.036 0.025 0.025 0.100 0.325 0.025 0.025
Engineering 0.200 0.225 0.025 0.225 0.150 0.025 0.110 0.036 0.025 0.025 0.100 0.325 0.025 0.025
Total 0.200 0.300 0.025 0.225 0.219 0.075 0.110 0.036 0.025 0.036 0.100 0.325 0.025 0.025
Telecommunications
Fixed 0.492 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.550 0.075 0.290 0.251 0.275 0.425 0.400 1.000 0.125 0.075
Mobile 0.200 0.225 0.075 0.225 0.550 0.075 0.110 0.251 0.075 0.125 0.100 0.325 0.125 0.075
Total 0.419 0.338 0.300 0.525 0.550 0.075 0.245 0.251 0.225 0.350 0.325 0.831 0.125 0.075
Construction 0.200 0.175 0.025 0.225 0.100 0.025 0.110 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.100 0.325 0.025 0.025
Distribution 0.200 0.258 0.092 0.225 0.050 0.092 0.160 0.125 0.092 0.125 0.117 0.392 0.075 0.092
Finance
Insurance 0.200 0.275 0.075 0.275 0.150 0.075 0.330 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.150 0.765 0.119 0.119
Banking 0.300 0.175 0.075 0.575 0.150 0.075 0.110 0.075 0.075 0.119 0.100 0.325 0.075 0.175
Total 0.277 0.198 0.075 0.506 0.150 0.075 0.161 0.085 0.085 0.119 0.112 0.427 0.085 0.162
Hotels and restaurants 0.200 0.175 0.025 0.225 0.050 0.025 0.110 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.100 0.325 0.025 0.025
Transports
Air 0.500 0.615 0.425 0.625 0.350 0.157 0.242 0.201 0.207 0.257 0.400 0.457 0.157 0.201
Maritime 0.500 0.307 0.157 0.375 0.200 0.157 0.454 0.369 0.207 0.257 0.400 0.325 0.069 0.157
Road 0.200 0.414 0.130 1.000 0.200 0.163 0.154 0.072 0.080 0.503 0.188 0.380 0.069 0.122
Total 0.437 0.432 0.240 0.590 0.250 0.158 0.320 0.250 0.180 0.309 0.355 0.381 0.098 0.164
Electricity 0.700 0.615 0.275 0.725 1.000 0.775 0.860 1.000 0.525 1.000 0.600 1.000 1.000 1.000
Manufacturing 0.200 0.175 0.025 0.225 0.050 0.025 0.110 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.100 0.325 0.025 0.025
TOTAL 0.270 0.268 0.091 0.352 0.171 0.087 0.177 0.111 0.084 0.130 0.164 0.390 0.074 0.097
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Table 3.  Indices of FDI restrictions, 1998-2000 (cont.)
Source: See section on data sources.
Japan Korea Mexico Netherlands
New 
Zealand
Norway Poland Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey
United 
Kingdom
United 
States
Business services
Legal 0.250 0.100 0.525 0.025 0.125 0.119 0.225 0.075 0.125 0.119 0.100 0.250 0.025 0.050
Accounting 0.250 0.275 0.400 0.025 0.125 0.119 0.175 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.075 1.000 0.025 0.050
Architecture 0.250 0.075 0.225 0.025 0.125 0.069 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.069 0.075 0.150 0.025 0.050
Engineering 0.250 0.075 0.225 0.025 0.125 0.069 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.069 0.075 0.150 0.025 0.050
Total 0.250 0.131 0.344 0.025 0.125 0.094 0.138 0.086 0.099 0.094 0.081 0.425 0.025 0.050
Telecommunications
Fixed 0.750 0.525 0.425 0.185 0.525 0.469 0.675 0.351 0.275 0.469 0.375 1.000 0.025 0.350
Mobile 0.250 0.525 0.325 0.025 0.125 0.069 0.675 0.351 0.275 0.169 0.075 0.450 0.025 0.550
Total 0.625 0.525 0.400 0.145 0.425 0.369 0.675 0.351 0.275 0.394 0.300 0.863 0.025 0.400
Construction 0.150 0.075 0.325 0.025 0.125 0.069 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.069 0.075 0.250 0.025 0.050
Distribution 0.150 0.325 0.242 0.025 0.125 0.119 0.175 0.142 0.125 0.069 0.092 0.350 0.092 0.050
Finance
Insurance 0.150 0.375 0.325 0.119 0.125 0.119 0.100 0.169 0.207 0.119 0.125 0.250 0.119 0.150
Banking 0.200 0.475 0.325 0.075 0.125 0.119 0.325 0.175 0.163 0.119 0.125 0.250 0.075 0.150
Total 0.188 0.452 0.325 0.085 0.125 0.119 0.273 0.174 0.173 0.119 0.125 0.250 0.085 0.150
Hotels and restaurants 0.150 0.075 0.375 0.025 0.125 0.069 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.069 0.075 0.150 0.025 0.050
Transports
Air 0.650 0.475 0.500 0.257 0.625 0.569 0.375 0.307 0.501 0.301 0.475 0.450 0.201 0.550
Maritime 0.250 0.425 0.525 0.157 0.225 0.469 0.375 0.307 0.401 0.301 0.525 0.550 0.201 0.650
Road 0.150 0.225 0.372 0.080 0.125 0.407 0.175 0.138 0.075 0.219 0.175 0.342 0.025 0.280
Total 0.362 0.399 0.484 0.174 0.337 0.489 0.333 0.271 0.365 0.284 0.434 0.473 0.164 0.539
Electricity 0.150 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.819 1.000 0.825 0.575 0.569 1.000 1.000 0.025 0.500
Manufacturing 0.150 0.075 0.025 0.025 0.125 0.069 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.069 0.075 0.150 0.025 0.050
TOTAL 0.230 0.260 0.273 0.083 0.189 0.182 0.213 0.157 0.165 0.140 0.172 0.338 0.064 0.169
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Figure 1. FDI restrictions in OECD countries, 1998-20001
1. The indicator ranges from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive).
2. Includes limits of foreign ownership, restrictions on foreign personnel and operational freedom, screening requirements.
Source: See Section on data sources.
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transition countries in particular, restrictions have been substantially eased or
even eliminated in sectors such as telecommunications in the last few years.
The most basic observation is that on the whole the OECD countries are now
quite open to foreign direct investment inflows. No country has an overall index
above 0.4 and most are well below. There are, however, significant differences
between countries and across sectors. The most open countries are in Europe.
Since the late 1980s, intra-EU FDI flows are almost completely unrestricted and
the EEA has also liberalised intra-bloc investment to some extent. In addition, a
number of European countries have minimal overt restrictions on inflows from
non-EU and non-EEA countries. The countries with the highest levels of overall
restrictions are Iceland, Canada, Turkey, Mexico, Australia, Austria and Korea, with
restriction scores above 0.25. The United States is a bit below the OECD mean,
and Japan is above the OECD mean. The US score may seem surprising. But it
should be remembered that the coefficients here do not represent all barriers to
doing business but rather discriminatory barriers against foreign firms. The United
States may have relatively unregulated markets on the whole but it does have dis-
criminatory barriers to FDI in several sectors.7 Excluding screening requirements
(Figure 1, panel B) has little effect on the ordering. New Zealand, and to a lesser
extent Australia and Spain become relatively more open.
Within Europe, there are some important differences in restrictions. Even the
European Union is not a completely unified bloc in terms of policies towards
inward FDI. Substantial harmonisation and intra-EU liberalisation has occurred,
however. Countries with the lowest levels of restrictions include the United
Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, and Italy.
Norway, Finland and Spain have among the highest restrictions in Europe, with
Iceland having the highest of all countries. Overall, however, restrictions in most
European countries are well below the OECD average, as further shown in Figure 2
(baseline case). An important reason for this is that the calculations adjust for pref-
erences granted to intra-EU or intra-EEA investment. These adjustments con-
sisted of scaling down European country scores in cases where such intra-
European preferences were granted.8 Figure 2 shows the effect of alternatively
including or excluding this adjustment, which could be viewed as understating
Europe’s restrictions. It could be argued that the European Union should be con-
sidered an individual country for these purposes – just as it would be inappropri-
ate to consider the absence of intra-State restrictions in the United States as an
indication of freedom of international investment flows. Even after excluding the
adjustment, European restrictions are on average below the OECD mean, and sev-
eral EU countries remain the least restricted in the OECD. Under the alternative
scenario of disregarding intra-EU preferences, average EU restrictions now exceed
those of the United States, but remain below Japan’s. There are substantial differ-
ences in the effect of excluding this adjustment on individual European countries,
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as shown in Annex II, although the ranking of countries within Europe by degree of
restrictiveness is not greatly altered.
Sectoral scores. It can be seen from Table 3 and Figures 3 and 4 that services are
far more restricted than manufacturing. FDI inflows into manufacturing are almost
completely unrestricted, aside from economy-wide measures such as screening. In
fact, many countries seek to encourage foreign investment in manufacturing.9 Con-
struction and hotels and restaurants are also relatively lightly restricted. Some
“sensitive sectors”, notably telecoms, transport, electricity, and finance are often
highly or significantly restricted. Electricity has the highest score, but this derives
more from public ownership than overtly discriminatory barriers against foreign
investment. Airline transport, fixed line telecommunications, and banking in par-
ticular are subject to substantial explicit barriers against FDI in many countries, as
shown in Table 3 and Figure 4. Media, such as newspapers and broadcasting, are
also highly restricted but were not included in this study due to lack of data for
some countries. Figure 4 shows the pattern of restrictions for selected countries in
comparison to the OECD average pattern, for the service sectors. Most countries
have relatively restricted electricity, transport, telecommunications and finance.
The sectoral variation of restrictions is quite marked in the United States where
some sectors are almost completely unrestricted whereas others have relatively
high levels of restrictions. For some countries such as Iceland and Canada all sec-
tor scores are high, usually reflecting the presence of across-the-board screening
Figure 2. Effects of removing intra-European preferences on FDI restrictions1
1. The European Union variant ignores intra-European preferences in calculating European restrictions. The
European Union baseline incorporates intra-European preferences.
2. Simple average.
Source: See Section on data sources.
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requirements. Even the most open countries have restrictions on a few sectors,
particularly airlines, and some across-the-board restrictions, such as limitations on
movement of people.
Decomposition by type of restriction. Figure 5 presents the results for the whole
economy by type of restriction: limitations on foreign ownership (equity), screen-
ing, and other (management and operational restrictions). The greatest variations
are in equity restrictions and screening. The differences in scores between coun-
tries reflect both the extent to which countries make use of these measures and
their severity.
Some countries, notably in Europe, have no or very limited discriminatory
screening of foreign investment. Screening is minor in the United States and
Japan. Iceland was deemed to have the most restrictive screening requirement,
with Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, Canada, Austria and Spain also having rela-
tively extensive screening.
All countries have equity restrictions, but these vary substantially. These
equity restrictions are concentrated in a few sensitive sectors, namely transport,
telecommunications, finance and electricity. It is these restrictions that account for
the bulk of the sectoral variation in OECD average restrictions observed in
Figure 3. Almost all countries have some equity restriction in airline and maritime
transport, although the severity varies. The NAFTA countries have among the highest
Figure 3. Cross sectoral patterns of FDI restrictions, 1998-20001
1. The indicator ranges from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive).
Source: See Section on data sources.
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level of equity restrictions, and there are no intra-NAFTA waivers of these restric-
tions. Mexico is one of the few countries where these equity restrictions apply to
most service sectors. In the United States equity restrictions are confined to a few
sectors, but are relatively high in these instances. Turkey and Korea also had rela-
tively stringent equity restrictions in 1998, although some of these have been lib-
eralised since then or are scheduled to be. European equity restrictions are
usually but not always waived for investors from other EU or EEA countries, which
largely explains the low equity scores in Europe. Also, some of these countries,
Figure 4. Cross-sectoral patterns of FDI restrictions,1 1998-2000
1. The indicator ranges from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive).
2. Average of EU nations.
Source: See Section on data sources.
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Figure 4. Cross-sectoral patterns of FDI restrictions,1 1998-2000 (cont.)
1. The indicator ranges from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive).
Source: See Section on data sources.
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such as Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Germany,
have hardly any such restrictions to begin with.
Japan has the highest level of “other” restrictions, partly reflecting the allega-
tions of lack of transparency and procedural delays documented in some sectors
in USTR and EU reports. This is one of the instances where intangible barriers to
FDI were taken into account in the scoring. Similar allegations by USTR about
European telecommunications markets and Japan’s METI about the United States
were also factored into the US score.
The effect of switching to value-added weights (each sector’s share of GDP)
in aggregating sectoral restrictions scores had minimal effects for most countries,
with the United States being the major exception. With value added weights,
most countries FDI restriction scores fall modestly as value-added weights tend
to give greater weight to services that are not heavily restricted such as business
services, distribution, and hotels and restaurants. Since United States restric-
tions are unusually concentrated in a few sectors, the use of value added
weights significantly lowers the US restrictions score. A number of European
countries, however, still have lower scores than the United States. See Annex II
for further results.
Figure 5. FDI restrictions in OECD countries, 1998-2000: 
breakdown by type of restriction1
1. The indicator ranges from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive).
Source: OECD.
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Time series results
The cross-section restriction measures were extrapolated backward in time
using OECD documents. This could only be done for long-standing OECD coun-
tries, however, and the findings should be viewed with greater caution than the
cross-section results, due to lesser available information and reliance on a less
varied set of sources. The results are found in Table 4 and Figure 6.
It can be observed that restrictions on FDI have decreased markedly over
time for most countries. A major exception is the United States, which in the
early 1980s was one of the most open countries but was in the middle of the pack
by the late 1990s. This reflects the fact that there have been almost no changes in
the United States, while most other countries have greatly liberalised access for
foreign investors. In the early 1980s, a number of countries had total scores in the
Table 4.  Indices of FDI restrictions over time
Total economy
Source: See section on data sources.
1980 1990 2000
Australia 0.460 0.332 0.270
Austria 0.432 0.432 0.268
Belgium 0.291 0.291 0.091
Canada 0.484 0.379 0.352
Denmark 0.246 0.161 0.087
Finland 0.521 0.463 0.177
France 0.487 0.233 0.111
Germany 0.181 0.174 0.084
Greece 0.404 0.332 0.130
Iceland 0.600 0.481 0.390
Ireland 0.345 0.250 0.074
Italy 0.264 0.264 0.097
Japan 0.251 0.237 0.230
Netherlands 0.264 0.243 0.083
New Zealand 0.396 0.237 0.189
Norway 0.510 0.466 0.182
Portugal 0.569 0.223 0.157
Spain 0.336 0.230 0.165
Sweden 0.429 0.335 0.140
Switzerland 0.306 0.278 0.172
Turkey 0.507 0.391 0.338
United Kingdom 0.215 0.167 0.064
United States 0.171 0.170 0.169
Mean 0.377 0.294 0.175
Maximum 0.600 0.481 0.390
Standard deviation 0.128 0.101 0.094
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0.4 to 0.6 range. The changes have been particularly dramatic in several European
countries, notably Portugal, France, Norway, and Finland.
The liberalisation of inward foreign investment reflects a number of trends.
First, as noted earlier, the European Union has greatly liberalised intra-EU FDI,
and since about half of FDI into the EU is from other EU countries, this is tanta-
mount to a substantial overall liberalisation. Second, most countries have libera-
lised both their economy-wide and sector-specific restrictions, to varying degrees.
Third, the prevalence of public monopoly in sectors such as telecoms, banking
and transport has greatly diminished as privatisation has been pursued through-
out the OECD.10 This is one reason why FDI restrictions have changed less in the
United States than elsewhere: in the US there was much less to privatise and de-
monopolise to begin with.
Figure 7 shows the time series for selected sectors. Air transport and tele-
coms were almost completely closed to FDI in the early 1980s and are still more
restricted than other sectors, as noted in the previous section. But the change has
been even more dramatic in these industries than for the economy as a whole.
Figure 7 also shows that while there has been a steady trend towards liberalisa-
tion, the pace accelerated in the 1990s.
Figure 6. FDI restrictions in OECD countries, 1980-20001
1. The indicator ranges from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive).
Source: See Section on data sources.
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CONCLUSIONS
The last two decades, and especially the 1990s, have witnessed significant
liberalisation in FDI restrictions. OECD countries are now generally open to inward
FDI, although there remain substantial differences between countries and across
industries. The most open countries are now in Europe, at least as far as statutory
restrictions are concerned. The preponderance of remaining restrictions is in ser-
vices, with almost no overt restrictions in manufacturing. On the contrary, many
countries provide incentives for manufacturing investment, although systematic
evidence is lacking.
This paper has not evaluated the effects of restrictions, but Nicoletti et al.
(2003) uses the findings of this paper in an econometric model of FDI, and finds a
statistically important effect of the computed restrictions on FDI patterns.
The most heavily restricted sectors are those that are highly sensitive to
national security or national sovereignty considerations: telecommunications, air
and maritime transport, finance, public utilities, and media (the latter not consid-
ered in this study). Whether or not these restrictions are justified on social cost-
benefit grounds is a difficult issue beyond the scope of this paper, involving
tradeoffs between national sovereignty and economic efficiency. From an eco-
Figure 7. FDI restrictions over time in selected sectors, 1981-19981
OECD average2
1. The indicator ranges from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive).
2. Average for 23 OECD countries.
Source: See Section on data sources.
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nomic point of view, non-discrimination between domestic and foreign investors
is generally the best policy in the absence of a clear-cut market failure or threat to
national security. Liberalisation of remaining restrictions can be facilitated by con-
tinued discussions at the OECD and the WTO on multilateral rules for investment.
Further liberalization of restrictions discriminating against FDI could be accompa-
nied by efforts to discipline incentives that discriminate in favour of FDI.
This study has focused on statutory restrictions. Informal public or private
barriers remain mostly unaccounted for in the measures provided here. Future
research should focus on such non-transparent practices and institutional obsta-
cles. For example, free float in stock market capitalisation could be used as a
proxy for effective openness to acquisitions of minority shareholdings. The on-
going development of codes, guidelines and best practices in areas with direct
impact on public and private sector governance practices may enhance the possi-
bilities of pin-pointing and measuring non-conforming practices that affect relative
openness to FDI.
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NOTES
1. A number of bills were considered by the US Congress but the more restrictive mea-
sures did not pass, reflecting the still-strong support for openness to foreign invest-
ment in the United States. The Exon-Florio Provision of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act
gave the President the authority to restrict foreign investment for national security rea-
sons. This provision gave rise to considerable alarm, but the grounds for restricting
FDI are narrow and specific and it has almost never been invoked. See OECD (1992,
p. 22) and Graham and Krugman (1995).
2. See Golub (2003) for further discussion. 
3. The GATS schedules reflect commitments as of January 2000. Subsequent policy
changes are not incorporated. 
4. See OECD (2002) for further discussion of the Code. 
5. The OECD countries covered by this FDI study but not included in the APC studies are
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Iceland. 
6. For example, the USTR alleges “exclusionary practices” in Japan in some sectors and
discriminatory barriers against US firms in some European countries’ telecommunica-
tions markets. Similarly, METI cites “procedural delays” in the issuance of operating
licenses in telecommunications in the United States. In such cases, restriction scores
were increased by 0.1.
7. Switching to value-added weights, however, significantly lowers the US score, as dis-
cussed below.
8. Where restrictions on intra-European investments are waived, the restriction is
weighted by 0.44, reflecting the fact that 56 per cent of FDI inflows into European
countries were intra-European in 1998. This could overstate the effect of the waiver to
the extent that this waiver endogenously raises the share of intra-European FDI.
9. In manufacturing, social and regulatory policies such as health and safety regulations,
environmental standards, and technical standards undoubtedly also can act as indi-
rect restrictions, but these are not considered here. 
10. Electricity, however, has remained under public ownership in many countries. 
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Annex I 
COMPARISONS WITH HARDIN AND HOLMES (1997)
This annex provides more detail on the computation of the FDI Restrictions Indices, in
particular comparing the Hardin-Holmes (HH) methodology to the one adopted here. As
noted in the text, the weights used here are broadly similar to those of HH, in particular plac-
ing a high importance on equity restrictions. The HH weights are shown in Table A.1.
The main difference is that HH distinguish between restrictions on all firms from those
on existing firms only (mergers and acquisitions). But this distinction is of little consequence
as the bulk of FDI in OECD countries concerns existing firms. Also, few OECD countries dis-
tinguish between green-field and mergers and acquisitions in their statutory FDI restrictions.
Table A.1. Hardin and Holmes coefficients on FDI restrictions
Maximum 1.0
Source: Hardin and Holmes (1997).
Type of restriction Scores
Foreign equity limits on all firms
No foreign equity allowed 1
0-49 % foreign equity allowed 0.5
50-99 % foreign equity allowed 0.25
Foreign equity limits on existing firms, none on Greenfield
No foreign equity allowed 0.5
0-49 % foreign equity allowed 0.25
50-99 % foreign equity allowed 0.125
Screening and approval
Investor required to demonstrate net economic benefits 0.1
Approval unless contrary to national interest 0.075
Notification (pre or post) 0.05
Control and management restrictions
All firms 0.2
Existing firms, none for Greenfield 0.1
Input and Operational Restrictions
All firms 0.2
Existing firms, none for Greenfield 0.1
Total
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On the other hand, the equity limits were broken down into smaller ranges. In cases where
no equity restriction was listed, but the country had no GATS commitment, the lack of equity
restrictions is considered “unbound” and a score of 0.05 was given. Second, the HH weight
on screening seemed low, especially in the case where the burden of proof is on the investor
to demonstrate benefit, and was therefore raised. Third, in aggregating sub-sectors HH use
simple rather than weighted averages. Instead this study weights by economic importance,
using FDI weights for the OECD as a whole. Fourth, in HH multiple restrictions of the same
type are counted only once, which could possibly lead to an underestimate of FDI restrictive-
ness for countries that apply multiple restrictions, as they note. With a somewhat more
detailed breakdown of the types of restrictions here, following other studies of the Australian
Productivity Commission, this problem is partially circumvented. These include restrictions
on the residency and nationality of board members and duration of permissible stay for
expatriate personnel. Finally, this study covers a smaller set of services industries, but
includes electricity and manufacturing, a larger group of countries and a richer set of data
sources.
HH limited their study to APEC countries. Several other APC studies examined particular
sectors: telecommunications, banking, maritime services, professional services and distribu-
tion. The APC studies evaluated all modes of service delivery, rather than just FDI, and com-
parison with this study therefore required re-weighting the components of the APC scores.
After doing so, the correlation coefficient between this study’s results and those of the APC
for telecoms, banking, and maritime services were quite high at 0.58, 0.57 and
0.56 respectively. For distribution and business services it is lower but still positive (0.28 and
0.10 respectively). The low correlation for professional services is not surprising given that
commercial presence plays a minor role in the APC weighting indices and therefore is ill-
suited for the purpose of measuring FDI restrictions, even after attempts to re-weight them.
Annex I of Golub (2003) provides a more detailed comparison.
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Annex II 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS TO CHANGES IN ASSUMPTIONS
Intra-European FDI liberalisation. Figure A.1 shows the effects of removing of intra-European
FDI preferences, as discussed in the text. The effects are substantial, although they vary
somewhat by country. For some countries, e.g. the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland,
Sweden, and Greece, removing the effects of FDI preferences roughly doubles the country’s
restrictions score. Intra-European preferences are weakest in Austria and also relatively
small in Spain and Portugal, reflecting differences in the extent to which preferences are
granted to other European countries. For example, Austria’s screening requirements apply
to all foreign investments, including those from other European countries.
Figure A.1. Effects of removing intra-European preferences on FDI restrictions, 
1998-20001
European countries
1. The European Union variant ignores intra-European preferences in calculating European restrictions. The
European Union baseline incorporates intra-European preferences.
Source: See Section on data sources.
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Alternative Sector Weights. Table A.2. shows alternative weights for aggregating the sectoral
restrictions. The use of FDI weights raises a problem of endogeneity: highly restricted sectors
may experience less FDI and hence receive too low a weight. As noted above, services are
much more highly restricted than manufacturing, so any such problem of endogeneity is con-
centrated in the former. To deal with this problem, for the service sectors, an average of FDI
and trade weights was employed. The inclusion of cross-border trade in the weighting
scheme may be justified insofar as cross-border trade can substitute for FDI when the latter
is restricted. As an alternative, Figure A.2 shows the effects of using value-added weights
Table A.2. Sector weights
1. For the service sectors, an average of FDI and trade weights; for manufacturing, FDI weight.
Source: OECD.
FDI Adjusted FDI1 Value added
Business 0.18 0.18 0.22
Telecommunications 0.05 0.04 0.04
Construction 0.01 0.02 0.08
Wholesale, retail 0.13 0.09 0.17
Finance 0.25 0.16 0.07
Hotels, restaurants 0.01 0.01 0.04
Transport 0.01 0.14 0.07
Electricity 0.02 0.02 0.04
Manufacturing 0.35 0.35 0.28
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
Figure A.2. FDI restrictions measures under alternative weighting methods
Source: See Section on data sources.
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rather than FDI weights in aggregating the sectoral FDI restrictions measures into an aggre-
gate measure for the economy. As noted in the text, the use of FDI weights tends to slightly
lower most countries’ restriction scores. The largest effect is on the United States, which has
a substantial decline in restrictiveness. Canada also has a moderate decline in its restriction
score. In all other countries, the effect is minimal. The large effect on the United States
reflects the unusually skewed pattern of restrictions shown in Figure 4.
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